Search results

The swivel construction method is a specially designed process used to build bridges that cross rivers, valleys, railroads and other obstacles. To carry out this construction method safely, real-time monitoring of the bridge rotation process is required to ensure a smooth swivel operation without collisions. However, the traditional means of monitoring using Electronic Total Station tools cannot realize real-time monitoring, and monitoring using motion sensors or GPS is cumbersome to use.

This study proposes a monitoring method based on a series of computer vision (CV) technologies, which can monitor the rotation angle, velocity and inclination angle of the swivel construction in real-time. First, three proposed CV algorithms was developed in a laboratory environment. The experimental tests were carried out on a bridge scale model to select the outperformed algorithms for rotation, velocity and inclination monitor, respectively, as the final monitoring method in proposed method. Then, the selected method was implemented to monitor an actual bridge during its swivel construction to verify the applicability.

In the laboratory study, the monitoring data measured with the selected monitoring algorithms was compared with those measured by an Electronic Total Station and the errors in terms of rotation angle, velocity and inclination angle, were 0.040%, 0.040%, and −0.454%, respectively, thus validating the accuracy of the proposed method. In the pilot actual application, the method was shown to be feasible in a real construction application.

In a well-controlled laboratory the optimal algorithms for bridge swivel construction are identified and in an actual project the proposed method is verified. The proposed CV method is complementary to the use of Electronic Total Station tools, motion sensors, and GPS for safety monitoring of swivel construction of bridges. It also contributes to being a possible approach without data-driven model training. Its principal advantages are that it both provides real-time monitoring and is easy to deploy in real construction applications.

The application of servo steel struts enables the active control of the excavation-induced deformation in foundation pits. However, there is currently only one design axial force for each servo steel strut, which requires in-situ axial force adjustments based on the experience of site engineers. The purpose of this study is to develop a method for determining the design axial forces of servo steel struts at different excavation steps.

In this study, a hybrid method for determining the design axial forces of servo steel struts in different excavation steps was established based on the combination of the elastic foundation beam model and nonlinear optimisation.

The hybrid method is capable of providing a better set of design axial forces than the original design method. The lateral wall displacement and bending moment could be better controlled. Ordinary steel struts should be prevented from being set between servo steel struts to avoid axial force losses.

The axial forces of the servo steel struts at different excavation steps should be designed to achieve better deformation control effects. Moreover, a well-designed set of axial forces can also reduce the internal forces of the retaining structure.

The hybrid method enables the determination of the design axial forces of servo steel struts at different excavation steps, which can guide axial force adjustments in practical projects.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of current carbon tax (CT) policy on organizations involved in a sharing network relation.

For finding the CT and economic value of the industries connected in a sharing network model a multi-objective multi-integer linear model has been formulated. The data set of the case organization is used for computation. The formulated mathematical model is computed with the aid of GAMS optimization program.

This research paper demonstrates the effectiveness of the sharing network strategy in increasing the economic value and decreasing the CT for industries involved in sharing network. The CT value INR 3,012.694 for the industries in Scenario II which incorporates the sharing network is less than the CT INR 3,580.167 for industries in Scenario I without sharing network.

The data used for the computation is based on a particular sharing network under investigation. The formulated mathematical model can be checked with similar sharing networks by varying the parameters.

This work can aid in gaining complete knowledge on the sharing network strategy which can uplift the resources and the monetary value of the non-efficient industries moving them towards sustainable and greener supply chain practices.

The presented work can impact various industries in developing countries providing them with a strategy to enhance their resources and economic value by maintaining an amicable relation.

This work uniquely was able to validate economic feasibility and CT in accordance with the carbon footprint involved in sharing network. This sharing network also incorporates the concepts of circular economy and reverse logistics for showcasing a better strategy.

This paper aims to investigate the problem of searching for the equilibrium in the housing market, the mortgage lending market and the insurance market in the process of selling the residential property. Three classes of markets are established in three modes, which reflect the interdependence of the firms’ interests in these markets through the parameters of their integration. The paper aims to determine the prices in these markets on the basis of the compromises among the conflicting interests of the related firms, and, in addition, to assess the rationality of integration for firms, which are participants in the process of selling the residential property.

On the basis of the revenue sharing contracts and the supply chain coordination methods, the optimization models of the housing realtor, the mortgage bank and the insurance company are developed. The models consider the interdependence of the firms’ interests, the monopolistic competition in these markets and the conditions of the firms’ individual rationality in the interaction process.

The results of the study are as follows. First, as a consequence of a decrease in the demand curves in monopolistic competition, the housing market, the mortgage market and the insurance market are interconnected, therefore, the optimization models of the firms in these markets are interdependent through the revenue sharing parameters. Second, in these markets the individual firms’ sales optimums are not identical, therefore, the interests of the firms are contradictory. Third, in the realtor-bank-insurer system, the equilibrium satisfies the condition of zero revenue sharing payments between the agents; additionally, the equilibrium prices in these markets are mutually independent. Fourth, in the disequilibrium, the prices in these markets are interrelated, i.e. the price in one market increases with the price in another market, if the payment is directed from the former to the latter, and vice versa.

The results of the study are applicable in practice, if the markets demonstrate the decreasing demand curves and if the needs of buyers in related markets are interconnected.

The interaction between the realtor and the mortgage bank enables the realtor to raise its sales and the bank to increase in the number of loans, i.e. it leads to growth of their profits. The interaction between the insurer and the mortgage bank enables the insurer to increase in the number of policies and the bank to reduce the risk of lending, i.e. it leads to an increase in their profits. The identification of the individual firms’ sales optimums enables agents to determine the terms of the contracts of these interactions, which are compromises from the positions of each transaction participants. In addition, the firms’ optimums indicate the predictions of the equilibrium market prices.

In comparison with the studies in the contract theory framework, first, the mathematical description of the complicated (three-agent) system of interactions is proposed; second, the optimal choice non-linear models are developed, which take into account the non-linear demand functions in the monopolistic competition markets; third, the equilibrium of the agents with contradictory interests is investigated. In the later item, the authors establish that the revenue sharing contracts in the complimentary demands functions systems do not require the payments between the participants. Fourth, the authors prove that, in the equilibrium of these markets, the housing prices, the mortgage interest rates and the insurance rates are mutually independent and equal to the prices in the isolated markets.

This paper aims to find the endogenous relationship between innovation input and corporate performance and deepen the study of innovation performance theory in industry and enterprise at the micro level.

This paper selects the firms listed on A shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2015 as samples. The authors cluster these samples according to the factors of production and classify the samples into three types: technology-intensive, capital-intensive and labor-intensive. After obtaining the samples and classifying them, the authors conduct a research on the endogenous relationship between the innovation input and the corporate performance through the simultaneous equations model and 3SLS estimation method. Meanwhile, they also make a study on the influence of executive incentive mechanism on the relationship between the innovation input and the corporate performance.

In technology-intensive industry, the increase of pre-innovation input will enhance the corporate performance in the current period, however, which will slow down the pace of innovation and lead to lower corporate performance in the future, and then increase innovation input again. In contrast, in capital-intensive industries, innovation input just improves corporate performance in the current period and the promotion of corporate performance will promote the intensity of innovation input in the future. With labor-intensive industries, innovation input also depends on early good returns, but innovation input has no significant impact on the corporate performance both at present and in the future. While in the executive incentive mechanism, salary incentive has a significant positive regulatory effect on the relationship between innovation input and corporate performance.

This paper presents a new research perspective on the relationship between innovation input and firm corporate performance, which is of great value to the listed company in balancing the R&D input with the company’s target performance and the design of executive incentive mechanism.

An apparel supply chain primarily consists of geographically distant suppliers, manufacturers and retailers. The coordination among the members of the supply chain becomes difficult when we consider the triple bottom line of sustainability in it. Moreover, the complexity increases with the change in dominance power of the respective members. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability and dominance power simultaneously into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of three-echelon model to coordinate sustainable supply chain.

In this paper, the noncooperative game theoretic method has been applied for the exploration of models. The various structures of the centralized and decentralized supply chain are considered on the basis of a player's dominance power. The model uses simultaneous and sequential move games to analyze optimal profit of supply chain agents, total channel profit, green innovation level and corporate social innovation level.

Analytical results show that simultaneous game performs better than the sequential game. The consumer sensitivity toward green and social innovations increases total channel profit. We also proposed a linear two-part tariff contract model. The proposed model enhances the sustainability level and leads to perfect channel coordination. Using a numerical example, we present the effectiveness of multiple game structures under centralized and decentralized settings. The results reveal that channel efficiency is the highest in the two-part tariff contract followed by a simultaneous move game structure and lower in the cases of sequential move game.

In this research, model setting are deterministic and there is no any information asymmetry. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study multiechelon sustainable supply chain coordination models under stochastic and information asymmetry settings.

The paper includes implications for the development of sustainable supply chain coordination model to tackle the problems of dominance power, sustainability issues and lower channel efficiency of supply chain.

This study proposes game-theory-based three-echelon sustainable supply chain for the channel coordination.