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This study comprehensively reviews the global literature on busy boards and audit committees.

Six eight articles on busy boards and audit committees from prominent accounting journals are reviewed and analyzed under the “reputation” and “busyness” premise.

Most studies advocating the “reputation” hypothesis have the consensus that busy directors have their benefits (knowledge spillovers), particularly regarding sharing their in-depth knowledge, experiences and expertise. This phenomenon is pronounced for younger and IPO firms, which have high advising and financing needs. From the “busyness” perspective, busy directors are too overboard in carrying out their duty effectively and responsibly.

This study identifies future research avenues on busy boards/audit committees and suggests that policymakers and regulators should limit the number of board appointments.

This is the first study to extensively amalgamate research on busy directors and audit committees. It reveals the various proxies used to measure the busyness of board and audit committee members and the consequences of busyness.

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether multiple directorships have an influence on earnings management for Australian publicly listed firms. This paper attempts to determine whether boards with multiple directorships are effective monitors and are able to constrain earnings management activities.

The study adopts resource dependency theory on the relationship between multiple directorships and the extent of earnings management. Data analysis is based on publicly listed firms on Australian Stock Exchange utilising SIRCA database with a final pooled sample of 1,815 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2012.

Using different measures of multiple directorships, it is found that firms having board of directors with multiple directorships exhibit lower levels of earnings management. The results validate the applicability of resource dependency theory on the relationship between multiple directorships and the extent of earnings management suggesting that directors with multiple board seats by sharing experiences, skills, information and other resources limit the extent of earnings management by firms. Evidence also suggests that earnings management behaviour is more pronounced in larger firms compared to smaller firms and as predicted, industry audit specialists restrain earnings management activities.

This study introduces methodological enhancements to the literature as it measures the multiple directorships in a number of different ways. Firms may be encouraged to actively seek board members with diverse backgrounds, international exposure/experience and pertinent skill-sets with multiple board memberships. These benefits will assist firms to determine the optimal board composition that will enable it to function effectively.

Empirical studies on the association between multiple directorships and earnings management in Australia are scarce and this paper provides an update of the effect of multiple directorships on earnings quality in Australia.

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether there is an association between CEO age and analysts forecast properties (particularly forecast accuracy and bias/optimism). CEOs, having the central role in managing firms, can significantly influence the financial and non-financial decisions in an organisation. Furthermore, having been identified as key culprits in past major accounting scandals, it is also important to identify the CEO characteristics that affect financial reporting decisions.

This study adopts the upper echelon theory on the relationship between CEO age and analysts forecast properties. The authors use a sample of 2,730 Australian firm-year observations for the period 2004–2013 drawn from IBES, Connect 4 and SIRCA databases.

The authors find that analyst forecast accuracy increases and bias (optimism) reduces with the CEO age. The authors conclude that earnings and related information provided to analysts improves with the CEO age, which increases the forecast accuracy and reduces bias (optimism). Additional results suggest that the positive (negative) effect of CEO age on forecast accuracy (bias) remains until the CEOs reach the age of their retirement age (65 years). The results remain consistent with a number of sensitivity tests and provide implication for stakeholders such as firms, analysts, auditors, financial statements users and regulators.

The authors demonstrate that the relationship between CEO age and analyst forecast properties is not linear but is, in fact, curvilinear substantiating concerns that CEOs that are much younger or much older do not help increase the quality of the information environment. Consequently, firms hiring CEOs in the right age bracket also benefit by having higher-quality information environment leading possibly to reduce costs such as those relating to debt and/or equity ultimately increasing firm value.

Empirical studies on the association between CEO age and analysts earnings properties in Australia are scarce and this paper contributes to the determinants of the analysts forecast accuracy and bias (optimism) and the CEO age literature.