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This paper examines the impact of founder ownership concentration (FOC) on risk disclosures. It further investigates the moderating role of risk governance in the association between FOC and risk disclosures.

We use data from the top 200 Indian listed firms as our sample and rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) for our results. In addition, we use the propensity score matching, Heckman selection model and instrumental variable estimates for robustness checks.

We find that FOC decreases the risk disclosures. However, the effectiveness of risk management committee composition (risk governance) mitigates the negative influence of FOC on risk disclosures.

The paper is built on the agency theory. Based on the agency theory, the ownership concentration has two implications: first, it reduces the conflicts between managers and shareholders. Here, the managers act in favour of shareholders and therefore, brings more risk disclosers. Second, it invites conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. The study is, therefore, interesting to see the cost and benefits of FOC on risk disclosures.

The study has practical implications for the regulatory bodies to encourage risk disclosures and benefit the outsiders of the firm. It also has implications for the companies to see the benefits of risk management committee as improved risk governance.

It contributes to the literature of risk disclosures and risk governance in emerging economies. It is the first study to investigate the role of risk governance in mitigating the adverse effects of founder’s ownership on risk disclosures in developing economies. It also contributes to the theory of agency cost and information asymmetry.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of risk disclosures on firm value. We further investigate whether effective governance moderates the relation between risk disclosures and firm value.

We use a sample of the top 200 Indian listed firms on NSE from 2013 to 2018. The generalised method of moments (GMM) along with the ordinary least square (OLS) is used to investigate our research problem. Further, we use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique and the Heckman selection model for correcting selection bias in the robustness section.

We find that higher risk disclosures result in lower firm value. Besides, we show that better governance minimizes the negative impact of risk disclosures on firm value. This finding encourages firms to have a good governance mechanism to mitigate the adverse effects of risk disclosures in public.

The main contribution of our paper is to examine the moderating effect of governance between risk disclosures in the annual report and firm value (market-based and accounting-based) in the context of an emerging economy. Moreover, the paper highlights the potential moderating effect of independent directors and resourceful boards on the risk disclosures and firm value in the Indian context.

The authors examine whether internal corporate governance mechanisms are effective in curbing cash flow manipulation through real activities, misclassification, and timing.

The sample comprises of firms from an emerging market, India with data for years 2004 through 2015. The authors use the methodology given in Roychowdhury (2006).

The authors find that corporate boards in India play an active role in curbing cash flow manipulation through real activities but fail to control cash flow manipulation through misclassification and timing.

The study suggests that corporate boards should pay more attention to the reported cash flow numbers. Regulators can reduce the opportunities available for cash flow misclassification by fixing relevant accounting and governance norms. Auditors can also help by critically focusing on the cash flow classifications presented by management.

This study, to the authors’ knowledge, is the first study that talks about the role of internal governance in a trade-off between different cash flow manipulation techniques.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of disputed tax litigation risk on firm performance and stock return behavior using a sample of Indian listed firms.

The authors use disputed tax liability, reported as a contingent liability by the listed firms, as a proxy for the disputed tax litigation risk. To examine the impact of disputed tax litigation risk on firm performance (measured by accounting and market-based measures), the empirical approach used in this study focusses on the panel estimation technique. A portfolio-based approach using alternative asset pricing models examines the cross-sectional return variation because of the influence of disputed tax litigation risk.

The results of this study show a negative relationship between firm performance measures and disputed tax litigation risk. Cross-sectional test results reveal that higher disputed tax litigation risk is associated with higher expected returns.

This study focusses on disputed tax reported under the heading of contingent liability as a proxy for litigation risk. The study will help investors and portfolio managers to consider disputed tax litigation risk as an important parameter in the evaluation of firm performance. This study will also help regulators to get feedback on tax related policies and improve the dispute resolution process.

This study adds to the existing literature on the relationship between litigation risk and firm performance. In the context of emerging market, this study is the first-of-its-kind study, which focusses on disputed tax as a litigation risk proxy and examines its possible impact on firm performance and stock return behavior.

Section 177 of the Company Act 2013 and Regulation 18 of the Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements 2015 allow the audit committee to invite firm executives to participate in the audit committee meetings. In this study, we investigate the negative impact of the presence of invitees in the audit committee on firm value.

The study uses the Propensity Score Matching and Difference-In-Difference methodology (henceforth, PSM-DID) to establish a causal relationship between the presence of invitees and firm value. The final sample consists of 24,232 firm-year observations representing 4,493 distinct firms from 2016 to 2021. We also address the endogeneity and autocorrelation issues using the system-generalized method of moments (henceforth, GMM) as a robustness test.

We find that the presence of invitees in the audit committee decreases the firm value because investors consider this an alarming signal. We further find that the firms, audited by the Big 4, do not experience a decrease in firm value due to higher audit quality, whereas the firms with high promoter ownership experience a decrease due to the presence of agency cost.

We contribute to the literature on firm value and strengthen the literature on the importance of good governance in a developing nation using the signalling theory. This study adds to the understanding of firm value. The findings have implications for management literature and are valuable for policymakers and standard setters in evaluating the impact of disclosures in the capital market. The managerial implications emphasize the need for careful consideration of invitees in audit committees, considering industry, regulatory environment, and firm goals. Firms are advised to assess the benefits and costs, monitor the impact regularly, and strengthen internal controls.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the moderating effect of the board of directors on the strategic decisions made by family firms, and to understand the board attributes that can alleviate the aversion of family-owned firms toward mergers and acquisitions (M&A).

The study uses a sample of several firms listed in India from 2006 to 2019 with 19,813 firm-year observations. The empirical tests have been performed using logistic and negative binomial regressions. The study also tests for endogeneity with the help of Heckman (1979) two-step treatment effects model.

The study shows that board characteristics like smaller board-size, presence of outside directors, lower intensity of board activity, presence of busier board members and separation of board chair and CEO positions alleviate the inhibition of family firms toward M&A.

The findings imply that investors and policymakers can encourage family firms to have smaller boards, more independent directors, passive boards and CEO nonduality to reduce their aversion toward risky activities. Family-owned firms could consider a board comprising members with multiple directorships who can bring wider knowledge and expertise which can reduce the perceived threat to socioemotional wealth (SEW) and alleviate their aversion toward M&A.

Ownership concentration in family firms posits a unique challenge in terms of their aversion toward M&A. This study is one of the few that highlight the relevance of the monitoring and advisory role of the board in alleviating this aversion in an emerging market like India.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firm-level corporate governance measures and regulatory reforms constrain manipulation of operating cash flows, an important firm performance indicator.

The sample comprises firms from an emerging market, India, with data from 2005 to 2011. The authors use the methodology given in the paper by Lee (2012) and multiple regressions.

The authors find that cash flow manipulation is likely to increase with an increase in the controlling ownership. Furthermore, board diligence and better audit fail to curb such manipulation. However, the authors do find that such manipulation has gone down in the recent years, and diligent boards constrain it, possibly due to the recent steps taken by the Indian Government for improving the corporate governance environment in India.

The findings can act as feedback for the regulators and policy makers. Potential investors and analysts may also benefit from the study, since they can be more vigilant about the firms’ cash flow manipulation practices and can demand better governance.

The findings suggest that good corporate governance makes managers substitute earnings management with cash flow manipulation.

This paper aims to examine the impact of corporate governance practices on the level of financial disclosures made by the Indian firms. This assumes importance in the context of the role of financial disclosures in addressing the agency problem.

Financial disclosure score is computed by considering disclosures provided by the generally accepted accounting principles and is the dependent variable. The independent variable – corporate governance score – is an index comprising internal governance mechanisms. The authors empirically examine the impact of corporate governance practices on financial disclosure using multiple regression model for 200 large listed Indian firms.

The study suggests that quality of governance practices significantly improves financial disclosure practices of the firm. Particularly, the composition of the audit committee is effective in improving disclosures.

The finding has implications for policy makers and practitioners. It will help investors, lenders, and other stakeholders to assess firms’ financial disclosure quality. In addition, the findings, suggest the influence of governance practices on disclosure, might help in the formulation of appropriate policies about board structure and audit function. It is also a call to investors to emphasize on governance quality of the investing firms.

The study builds a case for an urgent intervention for improving the existing governance standards to advance the quality of financial disclosure in an emerging market context.