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The purpose of this paper is to bring to light the present civil and criminal asset forfeiture procedures within the South African context and to make suggestions for reform thereof. While there exists and is a need for constant change and reform of the law to ensure that it remains transparent, up-to-date and applicable to all means through which economic crime can be committed, South Africa lacks the necessary resources and attitudes to accomplish this essential goal.

The approach used in this paper is purely qualitative using journal articles, textbooks, reports, periodicals, speeches and legislation as its basis. It is through a consolidation of this literature that this paper was formed.

While South Africa’s present system of asset forfeiture is producing some impressive results, the process still has vast room for improvement. There are key areas which this paper outlines for reform. However, the probability of improvement is relatively low owing to the levels of corruption, illicit activities and attitudes of mistrust within the South African society at large.

The concept of asset forfeiture is not new to any international jurisdiction, let alone South Africa itself. However, this paper aims to give insight into the specific South African experience of this procedure and how it can possibly be improved within the specific context.

The purpose of this paper is to give light to the present order of state capture and corruption within South Africa at present. South Africans often consider the National Prosecuting Authority to be an independent body which is free of the corruption of the rest of the Government; however, the situation that surrounds the Kusile Tender will suggest otherwise.

This paper’s approach is purely qualitative using journal articles, textbooks, reports, periodicals, speeches and legislation as its basis. It is through a consolidation of this literature that this paper was formed.

This paper determines that even the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa is not free from the scourge that is corruption through the depiction of the Kusile Tender. Within this tender, the National Prosecuting Authority entered into a non-prosecution agreement with a defendant, Asea Brown Boveri, which cannot be accounted for in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.

The concept of state capture and corruption are not new to any jurisdiction, let alone South Africa. This paper, however, intends to give insight into how even the departments which the public believe to be (and are constitutionally mandated to be) independent can fall prey to corrupt dealings.