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This paper aims to analyze the volatility transmission between an energy stock index and a financial stock index in emerging markets during recent high instability periods. The study considers the impact of both the period under analysis and the data frequency on the direction and intensity of the contagion, as well as the effect of the potential spillovers on the risk measures. These questions still lack definitive answers and have become more relevant in a context of financially unsettling events such as COVID-19 crises.

This study employs an extension of the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model that allows for the time-varying dependence relationship between the variables. This dependence is analyzed at daily, weekly and monthly basis using data from the Bloomberg platform on energy and stock market indices for emerging markets between 2001 and 2021.

The results for a sample spanning from 2001 to mid-2021 show bidirectional volatility transmission on a daily basis, whereas only evidence of volatility transmission from the financial to the energy exists for weekly and monthly frequencies. However, considering different subsamples of daily data, the authors only find volatility transmission from financial (energy) index to the energy (financial) during the Great Recession (COVID-19) as a consequence of the different source of the shock and transmission channels.

This study reveals that volatility transmission between energy and stocks in emerging markets has changed and presents a unidirectional pattern from energy to financial markets during the COVID-19 period in contrast to calm and the sub-prime crisis intervals. These results differ from previous studies, focused on global markets, that show bidirectional spillovers during this period.

This paper aims to investigate the potential influence of managers on sustainability assurance. When the quality of sustainability reporting is questionable because of subsequent restatements, the authors explore whether assurance is used to enhance its credibility as a legitimization tool or as an impression management strategy. Additionally, the authors analyze how capital markets react to this potential managerial capture and, particularly, whether investors penalize this practice through the cost of capital.

Using an international sample from 2012 to 2016 and panel data regressions, this study relies on DICTION’s master variables of optimism and certainty to examine the impact of managers on assurance and the market’s reaction to these practices.

The study shows that some managers might use assurance as a legitimization tool rather than as a means of reinforcing the credibility of sustainability reporting. In such cases, the results reveal that investors penalize (reward) managerial influence (no influence) on assurance.

The new findings help companies understand that they will not improve their financing terms if investors perceive that managers have influenced assurance. Moreover, these findings emphasize the need for standardization to clarify assurance criteria and prevent managerial influence.

Managerial influence on assurance raises doubts about its value in terms of reducing information asymmetry and especially improving investors’ decision-making.

The present study represents the first evidence of the potential use of assurance for non-informative purposes. The authors provide clear evidence of how investors penalize managerial influence on assurance, in contrast to the mainstream literature, which shows that this practice always improves investors’ decision-making and is rewarded.

The current credit rationing strongly influences the viability of SMEs innovation projects. In this context, the practice of screening borrowers by project success probability has become a paramount consideration for both lenders and firms. The aim of this paper is to test the screening role of loan contracts that consider collateral-interest margins simultaneously.

This paper presents an empirical analysis that uses a unique data set composed of 323 bank loans granted by 28 banks to SMEs backed by a Spanish Mutual Guarantee Institution.

The results show that appropriate combinations of collateral and interest rates can distinguish between borrowers with different project success probability: low success probability borrowers finance its projects without collateral and with high interest rates, whereas high success probability borrowers accept loans with real estate collateral and low interest rates.

This screening mechanism reduces credit rationing, thus increasing good projects' access to credit.

This study provides the first empirical evidence on the effectiveness of collateral-interest pairs as a self-selection mechanism.