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The aim of this paper is to study the information content of operational loss events occurring at European financial institutions with respect to the announcing bank’s industry rivals from an equity investor’s perspective.

The authors conduct an event study to identify spillover effects of operational loss events using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as a benchmark model. In addition, they conduct multiple regression analyses to investigate the extent to which firm-specific factors or the market environment affect abnormal returns.

They observe significant negative abnormal returns following operational loss announcements exceeding € 50 million for both the announcing firms and their competitors. In addition, they find that stock market reactions occur only within a very small event window around the announcement date, indicating a high degree of market efficiency. Finally, abnormal returns tend to be insignificant for smaller loss amounts.

While operational risk is often believed to be strictly firm-specific, the results show that large operational risk events are not purely idiosyncratic; rather, they are systemic in the sense that they have contagious effects on non-event banks. Thus, the authors shed new light on how operational risk affects equity investors’ investment behaviour in an opaque and highly interconnected banking market.

This paper aims to analyze the impact of conjectural “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) guarantees on big and small US financial institutions’ stock prices during the 2008-2009 banking crisis.

The paper analyzes shocks to stock market investors’ expectations of government aid to banks in distress and respective spillover effects using an event study approach. We focus on three major events in late 2008, namely, the Lehman bankruptcy, the Citigroup bailout and the first announcement of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) by the US Government.

The authors found significant differences in market reactions to the respective events between small and large banks. For both the Lehman and the CPP event, abnormal returns on big banks’ stocks are negative, while small banks’ stocks tend to generate positive abnormal returns. In contrast, large banks strongly outperform small banks in the case of the Citigroup bailout. Results for a control group of non-financial firms indicate that this behavior may be specific to the banking industry. The authors observed significant spillover effects to both competitors and non-competitors of Lehman and Citigroup, and concluded that while the Lehman event shook the widely held belief in an implicit TBTF subsidy to large banks, the TBTF doctrine was reinstated shortly thereafter.

This paper shows that conjectural TBTF guarantees are priced in by equity investors. While government aid to large banks in distress may prevent negative effects on the stability of the financial system, it may also create negative externalities by putting small banks at a competitive disadvantage. The findings suggest that US and European regulators’ recent policy measures directed at establishing reliable bank resolution schemes should be a step in the right direction to level the playing field for small and large financial institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss agency relationships occurring in an impartial business valuation setting. In particular, it shows how monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, reputational concerns, and competition may affect the quality of valuation services rendered.

The paper reviews findings from auditing research and from the economic theory on credence goods, and applies them to an impartial business valuation setting.

Impartial valuation experts face incentives to either overwork, or underwork and overcharge their client. Which type of moral hazard is more likely to occur depends on the degree of competition among the agents. While market concentration gives rise to overworking, competition promotes underworking and overcharging. Due to regulatory differences, this effect is more pronounced in the valuation services market than in the auditing industry.

The results imply that a client may be able to infer how to set up an effective monitoring and sanctioning system from the degree of competition among the impartial valuation experts. Future research should empirically validate the theoretical findings, and explore the relationship between service quality and internal governance structures of business valuation firms.

The results underline the necessity of an effective valuation quality assurance system set up by the client. They are thus relevant for clients, but also for regulatory bodies seeking to ensure the integrity of the valuation services market, and for valuation service providers striving to improve their corporate governance system.

The paper offers a new perspective on the reliability of business values determined by impartial experts. It emphasises the potential influence of the experts' competitive environment on service quality, and it shows how to design an effective valuation quality assurance system.

We study the information content of issuer credit rating changes announced by a group of six Chinese credit rating agencies. We conduct an event study, and we use multivariate regression analyses to identify factors driving abnormal stock returns. Our results confirm prior findings for Western countries that downgrades are associated with significant negative abnormal returns. However, upgrades and positive or negative rating outlooks do not seem to have information content. While we cannot find differences in information content conditional on which rating agency issues the downgrade, we find that abnormal returns may vary with the target firm’s industry. In addition, the magnitude of stock price reactions to rating downgrades seems to be related to the business cycle to some extent. With respect to the role of the industry in explaining the information content of rating changes, our results may be biased due to small sample size. Nevertheless, they illustrate that the role the industry plays in explaining investor behavior may deserve special attention in future research. Our findings imply that new rating information seems to be processed quickly in the Chinese stock market, and that market reactions to rating signals are largely in line with what has been observed for Western stock markets. Both observations lend credibility to observable stock prices. The chapter sheds new light on the relevance of Chinese credit rating agencies from an equity investor’s perspective and confirms similarities between the Chinese and Western stock markets with respect to the way rating signals are processed by investors.

The purpose of this cross-national study is to evaluate the communality and differences in experiences and policy responses in the run up to the 2007-2009 credit crisis and during its critical early stages in Germany, Ireland and the UK. The importance of shared cognitive illusions regarding the power and stability of financial markets is emphasised.

A multiple case study approach is used which draws on publicly available information to trace developments leading up to bank failures (or near failures) and the evolution of government responses drawing upon alternative paradigms used to justify State intervention.

Findings emphasise the role of state regulatory bodies and their response to the crisis as a primary source of the “rules of the game” in financial markets, here it is the “game of bank bargains” and a potential source of repair. Given the degree of interconnectedness, opacity and complexity of financial markets investors/politicians/regulators will fall victim to cognitive biases which affect their decisions.

This case study method allows identification of patterns in decision-makers’ behaviour and yields richer insights than a quantitative approach but is limited in its generalisability.

This paper offers practical implications in suggesting that a pivotal step in effective crisis management requires directly addressing sources of uncertainty, namely, time pressure, complexity and opacity of underlying cause–effect relationships, empowering decision-makers to act responsibly.

This paper is novel in its illustration of the collective cognitive paradigm for justifying regulatory action across three countries using six case studies.

The purpose of this paper is to study the information content of about 3,300 global bank rating changes before and after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 to assess if differences in stock market reactions for small and big banks emerge.

The analysis of the stock market reactions of rating changes (upgrades and downgrades) and bank’s size (small and big) is conducted by an event study approach.

The authors find that while upgrades are not associated with significant abnormal bank stock returns, downgrades have a significantly negative effect. This result holds for both small and big banks, while negative abnormal returns are considerably stronger for the former. For small banks, the authors observe an increase in negative cumulative abnormal returns post-Lehman. The lack of a reaction to large banks’ rating downgrades in the narrow [−1,+1] event window indicates that their stock prices may, to some extent, be insulated from negative rating information even post-Lehman, which the authors attribute to an implicit “too big to fail” subsidy anticipated by equity investors.

This paper provides insights to the differences in the information content of changes in small and big banks’ credit rating on stock returns that is unrelated to the well-known size effect. Compared to small banks, big banks seem to some extent be insulated from negative rating changes even post-Lehman – contributing to the on-going too big to fail debate.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of sovereign rating signals on domestic banks’ stock returns in a European context.

The author uses an event study technique to measure short-term bank stock abnormal returns that result from domestic positive or negative sovereign rating events. Then, test results from the univariate event studies are further scrutinised with the bank- and sovereign-related factors related to cross-sectional variations in abnormal bank returns.

The univariate results show that positive sovereign rating events do not lead to significant bank stock price reactions, while negative events are associated with negative share price effects on domestic banks. The multivariate regression results for the subsample of negative rating events show that the degrees of contagion effects depend on which credit rating agency issues the signal, on whether the events are preceded by other negative sovereign rating signals, and in some cases on the sovereign’s initial rating level and on the bank’s liquidity ratio, profitability level and size.

The study improves the test procedures used by Caselli et al. (2016) and sheds light on the bank valuation effect induced by massive negative sovereign rating signals during the crisis period. The results highlight the share price effect of sovereign events and address political implications of introducing risk weights for sovereign debts.