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This study examines the performance of India's food processing sector by estimating its output growth, technical efficiency (TE) and input-driven growth (IDG)

This study used panel data from six food processing manufacturing industries for the period 2000–01 to 2017–18. Technical efficiency and input-driven growth was measured using the parametric half-normal stochastic frontier production function.

The findings of this study showed that the estimated average technical efficiency is 86.6%, which specifies that the Indian food processing sector is technically inefficient. In addition, the output growth rate is 5.5%, driven by high doses of inputs (5.7%), whereas there is no indication of constant returns to scale. However, the food processing sector has experienced more input-driven expansion than either technological or efficiency changes.

This study is limited to India's organized manufacturing food processing sector; the aggregate macro data at a three-digit level based on the national industrial classification (NIC) was used. This study provides robust estimates for industrialists and processors, as well as concrete policy formulations on how overdoses of inputs may lead to high exploitation of resources, whereas outputs can be augmented by implementing upgraded and new technologies.

Previous research has estimated the total factor productivity and technical efficiency only in order to analyze the food sector's performance, but none of the studies have evaluated the share of inputs in growth performance and efficiency. Therefore, this study contributes by measuring growth performance and the share of inputs in the growth performance of India's food processing sector.

The empirical relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, the investment opportunity set (IOS) and corporate governance mechanisms is analyzed for a sample of 415 Canadian firms in 1997. Results indicate that firms with high IOS pay higher levels of total compensation to their CEOs. In addition, CEOs of high IOS derive a larger proportion of their compensation from performance‐contingent forms of pay such as bonuses, stock option grants and long‐term incentive plans. However, CEOs with weak boards of directors are compensated more than CEOs with powerful boards. Contrary to our expectation, we find that in high IOS firms with weak boards of directors, CEOs seek to have higher proportions of contingent forms of pay in their compensation. An implication of this result is that contingent compensation practices may be a more value‐enhancing form of remuneration for CEOs.

Relationships between corporate governance characteristics and financial distress status are examined for a sample of Canadian firms. Results from logit regression analysis of 46 financially distressed and 46 healthy firms lead us to conclude that the board of director’s composition explains financial distress, beyond an exclusive reliance on financial indicators. Additionally, supplemental results indicate that outside directors’ ownership and directorship affect the likelihood of financial distress. Furthermore, splitting financially distressed firms based on chief executive officer change as a proxy of turnaround strategies provides useful insights on corporate governance characteristics in financial distress.

The purpose of the paper is to explore the long-run impact of board governance and bank performance on executive remuneration. More specifically, the study addresses two objectives. First, the authors investigate the long-run relationship between pay and performance hold for the Indian banking industry. Second, the authors explore the moderating role of the board in explaining the relationship between executive pay and performance.

The study uses multivariate panel co-integration approaches, i.e. fully modified and dynamic ordinary least square, to explain the co-integrating relationship between executive pay, governance and performance of Indian banks. The analysis is conducted for the period from 2005 to 2018.

The results of co-integration tests reveal a long-run relationship between executive pay, board governance and bank performance. The long-run estimates produce evidence in favour of the dynamic agency theory, suggesting that the implications of asymmetric information can be mitigated by associating the current executive pay with the bank performance in the previous periods. The finding of this study reveals that improvements in the board quality serve as a monitoring tool to constrain excessive pay and moderate the executives’ pay. Furthermore, the interaction of performance and board governance negatively impacts pay, supporting a substitution approach. It implies that setting optimal pay packages for executives necessitates enhanced and efficient board governance practices.

The study recommends significant policy implications for regulators and the board of directors that executive pay significantly responds to the bank’s performance and good board governance practices in the long run.

This paper provides novel evidence of long-run pay-performance-governance relation using a panel co-integration approach.