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This paper aims to examine the impact of gender diversity on boards and on top management positions on excess cash holdings.

The authors adopt the quantile regression approach to test the relation between gender diversity and excess cash holding. The sample consists of 1,235 firm-year observations for the period 2005–2017.

The authors find that board gender diversity negatively influences the level of excess cash. This result suggests that women appointed in the boardroom are effective in monitoring managerial actions, including financing policies. The results also show that by forcing companies to have a quota of women on their boards, the presence of women no longer has a negative impact on excess cash holdings. However, when women stand at the chief executive officer or chief financial officer position, they tend to accumulate cash for precautionary motives. These results suggest that women behave differently regarding excess cash holding as monitors compared to their role as decision-makers.

The results may be of interest to legislators who may decide to break the glass ceiling, preventing women from gaining greater access to senior management positions. This is in line with the recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF Governance Code of 2020, which strongly recommends the recruitment of women to senior management positions. The results are also important to investors, who might be likely to trust companies in which women hold positions on boards of directors which may increase firm value. The results may also have a social impact. Indeed, the role of women in society may be enhanced if such initiatives are taken to increase their representation on leadership positions and in society in general.

The results may also have a social impact. Indeed, the role of women in society may be enhanced if such initiatives are taken to increase their representation on leadership positions and in society in general.

This study investigates the role of women both as controllers and decision-makers in holding excessive amounts of cash. It also highlights new evidence on the impact the approach of appointing women on boards (enabling/coercive and market-based) can have on the relation between gender diversity and excess cash holdings.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effect of French family control on the cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSC). It also investigates the moderating effect of board of directors’ features on this relation.

Based on a sample of French-listed companies from 2012 to 2014, the authors use GLS regression models on panel data estimated with robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level.

The results show that family control is positively associated with the CFSC. This finding suggests that families are likely to hold more cash out of their cash flows for entrenchment and expropriation purposes. A further analysis shows that board size, independence and the two-tier board structure negatively affect the CFSC in family firms. Board efficiency is then a guarantee of minority shareholders’ interests against family expropriation risks in France.

These findings suggest that French family firms are likely to expropriate minority interests by extracting rents through their cash holding behavior. However, in the presence of high-quality board features, the relation turns negative, suggesting that the quality of the board is an efficient corporate governance device that is likely to monitor family corporate decisions.

This paper extends previous research by investigating the moderating effect of board features on the relation between family control and the CFSC. The research provides a metric for agency problems that is the sensitivity of cash to cash flows and offers theoretical support for the agency argument of hoarding cash.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effect of family ownership on corporate tax avoidance. It also investigates whether audit quality affects tax avoidance practices by family firms.

Based on a sample of 55 Tunisian listed companies from 2008 to 2013, the authors use GLS regression models estimated with robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level.

The results show that family ownership is positively associated with corporate tax avoidance practices, suggesting that families expropriate minority interests by extracting rents from tax-saving positions. These practices are less prominent after the 2011 Tunisian revolution, suggesting that the pressure from governments and non-governmental organizations against corruption and unethical behavior has increased after the revolution. However, the findings show that audit quality curbs the incentives of family firms to engage in aggressive tax positions, supporting the moderating effect of audit quality on the relation between family ownership and tax avoidance.

These findings suggest that Tunisian family firms are likely to expropriate minority interests by extracting rents from tax-saving positions. However, in presence of high-quality audit, the relation turns negative, suggesting that external audit quality is an efficient corporate governance device that is likely to monitor family corporate decisions.

This paper extends previous research by investigating the moderating effect of external audit quality on the relation between tax avoidance and family ownership. It also examines tax avoidance by family firms in a unique setting: Tunisia, a transitioning economy subsequently to the 2011 revolution, where investors’ rights are weakly protected and the financial market is not well-developed as in more developed countries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence on earnings quality and the moderating role of ownership structure as a crucial corporate governance device.

The paper uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation method to test our models on a sample of 335 French companies between 2009 and 2020, i.e. 4,020 observations.

The results show that CEO overconfidence negatively affects earnings quality. This result supports the predictions of behavioral finance theory and suggests that CEO overconfidence is a behavioral bias that affects the quality of earnings. The authors also examined the effect of different types of ownership structures on this relationship. The results show the significant role of controlling shareholders, owner-managers, families and institutional investors in mitigating the negative effect of CEO overconfidence on earnings quality.

This paper has some limitations. First, other types of ownership structures could have been analyzed such as state ownership. Second, we ignored the role of the board of directors as an important governance mechanism in controlling overconfident CEOs’ actions.

Companies should be aware of the potential risks associated with CEO overconfidence, which can compromise the faithful representation of earnings. This highlights the importance of effective monitoring and internal controls to detect and prevent such practices, which involve the role of ownership structure.

This paper addresses the effect of CEO overconfidence on earnings quality and provides new evidence on the role of different ownership structure types in shaping this relationship. Additionally, this paper sheds new light on how overconfident CEOs may behave in challenging times.

This study provides new insights into the relationship between the heterogeneity of institutional investors (IIs) and corporate tax avoidance (CTA). It also investigates whether family ownership moderates this relationship.

Based on a sample of 200 French-listed firms from 2008 to 2017, we use the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to address endogeneity and omitted variable concerns.

The results show that passive IIs are associated with an increase in the level of tax avoidance. However, active ones significantly decrease the levels of tax avoidance practices. Moreover, we show that institutional activism is not sufficient to control managerial actions, particularly in the context of controlled family businesses. The results suggest that families may expropriate the rights of minority shareholders through a controlling coalition with passive IIs.

This study has several practical implications. First, the results are useful for policymakers who should constrain passive IIs to provide only one service (asset management). Second, this study may sensitize family owners to the need to cooperate with active IIs that are effective in monitoring the firm. In particular, families should be willing to sacrifice some of their socioemotional wealth to promote a balanced ownership structure, which is important for responsible and effective corporate governance.

This paper extends previous research by investigating the heterogeneity of IIs in terms of horizon, ownership and control. In addition, this paper sheds a new light on how family firms behave regarding tax avoidance practices in the presence of active and passive IIs.

This paper aims to investigate the joint effect of board independence and gender diversity on the effectiveness of boards in monitoring CEO compensation in a continental European context, i.e. France.

Fixed-effect regressions are used to study the impact of board independence, gender diversity and their interaction, i.e. the proportion of female independent directors on the different components of CEO compensation (total, fixed and variable).

The authors observe that both the proportions of independent directors and women sitting on the boards positively influence the various components of CEO compensation. However, the interaction of these factors, i.e. the proportion of female independent directors, is negatively associated with CEO compensation. These results suggest that independent women directors improve board effectiveness in monitoring CEO compensation, especially its fixed component.

The results of this research help to elucidate the importance of women being appointed to boards as independent directors to properly monitor managerial pay. These results provide support to the approach of the French Cope-Zimmerman law of January 2011, which promotes female representation on boards as independent directors to enhance board decision-making. Thus, evidence presented and discussed in this paper should provide useful insights for academics, corporate managers and regulators.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between earnings management and the efficiency of French firms’ investments. It also investigates the moderating effect of board of directors’ features on this relation.

This study is based on a sample of French listed companies from 2011 to 2015, i.e. 435 firm-year observations. The authors use the instrumental variable method based on 2SLS models.

The authors show that there is a negative relationship between earnings management and investment efficiency. This finding supports the theoretical perspective of the agency theory, as the propensity of firms to engage in earnings management practices is associated with high managerial opportunistic behavior and asymmetric information issues, leading to the problem of under and overinvestment. The findings also show that board size, independence and gender diversity are positively associated with investment efficiency. These board features moderate the relationship between earnings management and investment efficiency suggesting that earnings quality plays a more prominent role in guiding managers to choose the right investments when the corporate governance environment is strong.

The negative relationship between earnings management and investment efficiency suggests that firms with lower earnings quality are exposed to high information asymmetries. They are then more likely to deviate from their expected level of investments. In addition, the results highlight the importance of corporate financial transparency and board monitoring to reduce agency costs and ensure the efficiency of corporate investments, particularly in a setting where investors’ interests are poorly protected.

This paper is the first to the best of the authors’ knowledge to examine the effect of earnings management, a metric for earnings quality, on the corporate investment efficiency in France. Besides, they extend previous literature by investigating how board features are able to monitor managerial actions and decisions and therefore to moderate the effect of earnings management on investment efficiency.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on earnings quality in a continental European context (i.e. France) more than a decade after their mandatory adoption. Furthermore, the authors investigate whether the IFRS effect depends on firm-specific incentives.

The authors construct an aggregated measure that considers the main qualitative information characteristics: reliability and relevance. They identify accruals quality, earnings smoothing and the degree of conditional conservatism as attributes of reliability and use earnings persistence, predictability, value relevance and timeliness to measure earnings relevance. To test the hypotheses, the authors use a sample of French listed companies. The analyses are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effects, the Newey–West estimator and the difference-in-difference approach. The authors also use cluster analysis to identify firms with high incentives for earnings quality.

The results reveal a decrease in earnings quality that persisted for a decade after IFRS adoption. This decrease is mainly due to a decline in earnings relevance, suggesting that the fair value principle worsened earnings volatility. However, the results show that there is an improvement in earnings reliability after IFRS adoption, suggesting that the international standards were able to constrain managerial opportunism. Additionally, the findings reveal that firm-specific incentives can enhance the positive effect of IFRS, but the incentives are not able to substitute for such effect.

The IFRS effect depends on firm-specific incentives.

The authors prove that firm-specific incentives are important to accentuate the positive effect of IFRS on earnings reliability and to mitigate the impact of IFRS on earnings relevance.

This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it addresses the relative lack of attention to the main qualitative characteristics in measuring earnings quality, that is, earnings reliability and earning relevance, and uses an aggregate earnings quality measure. Second, this paper uses a cluster analysis to highlight the role of firm-specific incentives in shaping the effect of IFRS on earnings quality.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility and earnings quality, specifically in family firms.

Based on a sample of French-listed firms from the period 2005 to 2016, the authors use the instrumental variable approach based on a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimator.

The results show that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance is positively associated with the relevance and faithful representation of earnings. This means that companies that commit to CSR activities are more likely to provide high earnings quality. The results also show that the positive association between CSR performance and earnings quality is more prevalent in family firms suggesting that socially responsible family firms are willing to preserve their socio-emotional wealth by disclosing high quality earnings.

The results suggest that French firms commit to CSR to satisfy the interests of their stakeholders by disclosing high-quality information supporting the conflict resolution view of CSR. The findings also support the socio-emotional wealth perspective and suggest that family firms that engage in CSR activities provide a rich informational environment through high earnings quality.

This study’s findings can be thus useful to investors for their portfolio management decisions by enabling them to identify the profile of companies with high earnings quality. These results may also help standard-setters and capital-market regulators improve market transparency by introducing new requirements to encourage investing in CSR.

This study extends the research on the relationship between CSR and earnings quality by focusing on two fundamental characteristics including relevance and faithful representation. This paper focuses on the effect of CSR on earnings quality in the specific context of family firms. This study offers then a better understanding of whether socially responsible family firms communicate stronger or weaker earnings quality than non-family firms based on the agency and socio-emotional wealth perspectives.

The purpose of this paper is to develop and test a conceptual model of bank performance.

The papers build a system of causal relationships between market structure, strategic choice and bank performance using the path analysis method. The sample includes commercial banks from 11 emerging countries.

Results show that market structure has a positive and indirect effect on bank performance, and that market share has a positive and direct effect on bank performance. Strategic variables related to risk taking and diversification affect directly and indirectly bank performance. The indirect effect occurs via market share. The results suggest that the mediating role played by the strategic choice in the relationship between market structure and performance is complete.

The contribution of this paper is threefold. The first one is to develop a conceptual model to explain bank performance. The model includes simultaneously direct and indirect causal relationships between market structure, strategic choice and bank performance. The second one is the use of the path analysis method to estimate the direct and indirect relationships. The third one is related to the sample including commercial banks in emerging markets.