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This paper aims to examine the interaction effect of regulations (monetary and macro-prudential) in explaining the possible non-linear effect of bank risk exposures (credit risk and insolvency risk) on banking stability in Africa.

The study uses a two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for a data set of banks across 54 African countries over the period 2006–2020.

The authors find that the relationships between bank credit risk–bank stability and bank insolvency risk–bank stability are non-linear and characterized by the presence of optimal thresholds, which are 5.3456 for credit risk and 2.3643 for insolvency. Contrary to their positive effects below these optimal thresholds, credit risk and insolvency risk become negatively linked to bank stability in Africa. The authors find that macro-prudential action and monetary policy both have a positive and significant relationship with bank stability. The authors provide evidence to support that the marginal effect of excessive credit risk and insolvency risk on bank stability is reduced when interacted with monetary and macro-prudential regulations, and the impact is significant in strong institutional environment.

Future research should extend data to include developing and emerging economies in the world. Also, policymakers, researchers and practitioners should consider different regulatory and institutional frameworks in explaining the relationship between the thresholds of bank risk exposures and bank stability in the world.

Regulatory authorities should have to deeply reform their financial systems, develop risk-based regulatory framework and effective supervision mechanism relating to appropriate techniques that maintain an optimal and desired level of bank risks and risk-taking behaviours required to ensure a stable banking system.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine how different regulatory frameworks shape the non-linear impact of bank risk exposures on bank stability in Africa.

Financial crises (FC) remain a global threat to the financial stability of financial institutions and international bank regulatory capital requirement (IBRCR) by the Committee on Banking Supervision provides mechanism for curbing the adverse effect of FC on financial stability. Hence, the purpose of this study is to provide, evidence on how IBRCR tones down the adverse FC effects on bank financial stability (BFS).

The study uses 102 economies between 2006 and 2016 in a two-step dynamic generalized method of moments model.

The results show that while FC and IBRCR negatively and positively impact BFS, respectively, it is observed that under the increasing presence of IBRCR, the negative effect of FC on BFS declines. Additionally, the results show that economies that maintain minimum IBRCR above 10.5% recommended by BASEL III are able to reinforce a significant reduction in the negative effect of FC on BFS.

These findings imply that in as much as financial crisis is injurious to BFS, regulators and policymakers can rely on IBRCR to avert the injurious effects of FC on BFS. Clearly, while IBRCR is necessary for reinforcing BFS through FC, bank managers who maintain IBRCR above the recommended 10.5% stands a better chance to taming the avert effect of FC on BFS. Additionally, economies that have not full adopted the BASEL minimum capital requirement may have to do so given its potential of dampening the adverse effect of FC on BFS.

The study presents an international perspective of how BASEL capital requirements can help tame global financial crisis using a global sample of 102 economies.