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The rise of cryptocurrencies and other digital assets has triggered concerns about regulation and security. Governments and regulatory bodies are challenged to create frameworks that protect consumers, combat money laundering and address risks linked to digital assets. Conventional approaches to confiscation and anti-money laundering are deemed insufficient in this evolving landscape. The absence of a central authority and the use of encryption hinder the identification of asset owners and the tracking of illicit activities. Moreover, the international and cross-border nature of digital assets complicates matters, demanding global coordination. The purpose of this study is to highlight that the effective combat of money laundering, legislative action, innovative investigative techniques and public–private partnerships are crucial.

The focal point of this paper is Australia’s approach to law enforcement in the realm of digital assets. It underscores the pivotal role of robust confiscation mechanisms in disrupting criminal networks operating through digital means. The paper firmly asserts that staying ahead of the curve and maintaining an agile stance is paramount. Criminals are quick to embrace emerging technologies, necessitating proactive measures from policymakers and law enforcement agencies.

It is argued that an agile and comprehensive approach is vital in countering money laundering, as criminals adapt to new technologies. Policymakers and law enforcement agencies must remain proactively ahead of these developments to efficiently identify, trace and seize digital assets involved in illicit activities, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the global financial system.

This paper provides a distinctive perspective by examining Australia’s legal anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing framework, along with its law enforcement strategies within the realm of the digital asset landscape. While there is a plethora of literature on both asset confiscation and digital assets, there is a noticeable absence of exploration into their interplay, especially within the Australian context.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the various characteristics of frequent-flier programs and the threats they pose to the Australian anti-money laundering regime.

A thorough literature review was conducted on frequent-flier programs and the associated money-laundering threats. Money laundering (ML) risks were identified in relation to the three stages of ML and effective law enforcement.

The findings indicate that as ML continues to gravitate towards the weaknesses in the financial system, frequent-flier programs provide yet another avenue for criminals to exploit. The risk factors associated with frequent-flier programs – specifically, anonymity, elusiveness, the rapidity of transactions occurring in a digital environment, ambiguity regarding responsibility for compliance, the global network of participants and members, difficulty in accessing records and an overall lack of oversight – were all integral considerations in establishing the ML risks of such programs.

The global environment in which individuals conduct financial transactions continues to evolve rapidly, exacerbating ML risks for regulators and governments alike. Unless there are globally unified efforts to heighten awareness, the threats posed by virtual currency will increase at a rapid rate. With this in mind, the starting point of this paper is an attempt to analyse the ML risks pursuant to frequent-flier programs in Australia.

The findings from this study can be used to gain greater insights into frequent-flier programs and can have broader application for evaluating other similarly structured loyalty programs, both in Australia and globally. Additionally, the findings from the study can enhance overall awareness of the ever-increasing threat to global financial integrity through the expansion of virtual currency.

The legal profession is vulnerable to abuse for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), that vulnerability justified updated global recommendations that urge countries to require lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals – including sole practitioners, partners and employed professionals within law firms – to identify, assess and manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with their services and to ensure that they have appropriate mechanisms in place to provide risk assessment information to competent authorities. Those recommendations proved contentious, with concerns raised by both legal academics and legal professional bodies about the implications of certain aspects of the requirements for the principle of lawyer–client confidentiality. Despite those concerns, many countries have introduced or amended regulatory regimes to extend their application to the legal sector to comply with the FATF’s standards. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate surrounding the extension of AML/CTF obligations to the legal profession.

This paper considers three jurisdictions – the UK, Israel and Australia – at different stages in their journey towards compliance with the FATF’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standards for the legal profession. While the UK has a long-established and well-embedded AML regulatory framework for legal professionals, Australia remains non-compliant with the FATF standards. Israel occupies a position between these two ends of the spectrum: following criticism of the omission of lawyers from its AML/CTF regime, Israel implemented due diligence rules for the profession. In 2018, Israel was found to be partially compliant with the relevant FATF recommendations.

It argues that although there are challenges involved, there are also important benefits. Therefore, Australia should act to implement its proposed changes sooner rather than later. Its persistent failure to appropriately address globally recognised areas of vulnerability leaves Australia open to integrity abuse. In addition, if the government delays addressing this issue until pressure from the FATF (such as deadlines for compliance and, if necessary, a finding of non-compliance) forces it to comply, this may tarnish Australia’s reputation, threaten its access to international financial markets and adversely affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of its AML/CTF regime.

Originality in this context refers to the distinctiveness and uniqueness of a paper’s content and approach. In this case, the originality lies in the fact that there is no other existing paper that addresses the topic of three common-law jurisdictions at various stages of their progression towards aligning with the FATF AML/CTF standards, specifically within the context of the legal profession. Furthermore, the timeliness of this paper is underscored by the fact that multiple jurisdictions are currently deliberating their positions on the focus of this paper. This adds to its originality and relevance, as it addresses a gap in the literature while also contributing to the ongoing discourse surrounding compliance with FATF’s standards.

This paper aims to explore the case of counter-terrorist financing (CTF) within the transnational regulatory network (TRN) of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The paper demonstrates how the structure and operation of the FATF reflect those of a TRN and shows how the FATF has been successful in securing formal compliance with CTF policies.

The paper stresses that formal compliance does not guarantee actual compliance or effective enforcement. It is argued that the FATF and the CTF regime must balance concerns for legitimacy with those of flexibility and efficiency. Traditionally, TRNs have focused on flexibility, efficiency and informal cooperation over legitimacy. This paper demonstrates that legitimacy concerns cannot be ignored.

A lack of legitimacy may ultimately result in non-compliance and ineffectiveness. On this basis, current efforts to build legitimacy through the FATF are noted but deemed insufficient. If this balance is not struck, the FATF may be doomed to failure through an overreliance on coercive methods. Particularly in the case of CTF, coercion is insufficient for meaningful compliance. Global enforcement by diverse states is a necessary condition for the success of the regime.

This paper will fill the gaps existing in the literature by examining CTF, as well as the FATF as an example of TRN. This approach differs from other literature in the field, which deals solely with the effectiveness of the FATF and the global CTF without considering the effect of legitimacy on compliance.

This paper aims to explore the ways in which the international standards in the field of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) have reshaped regulatory regimes in a globalised world.

This paper deconstructs the origins and development of international standards in the field of AML and CTF dealing with longstanding legal professional privilege. This paper adopts both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. The qualitative aspect comprises a literature review of sources, including scholarly works, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, reports and domestic laws. The quantitative aspect analyses a unique and comprehensive table reproduced below, that indicates Australia’s compliance with all the FATF recommendations over more than a decade with full alternation to FATF’s revisions of its recommendations.

This paper demonstrates that an understanding of the influence of the FATF norms can shed light on the departure from regular lawmaking processes and emerging forms of international governance. The conclusion suggests that tranche II is coming and Australia will amend it in domestic regime to comply with the international standard, applying the AML/CTF regime to the legal profession and thus interfering with legal professional privilege. The question is not if but when.

This paper fills the gaps in the existing literature by contemplating the future of legal professional privilege globally and in Australia, which provides a case study of a regime that does not yet comply fully with AML and CTF international standard. This approach differs significantly from that of other literature in the field, which deals comprehensively with the theoretical foundations of legal professional privilege, as well as its practicalities and limitations, without considering the influence of the international non-binding norms.

This paper aims to demonstrate to lawmakers that the addition of art dealers to the designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) definition would provide Australia with more comprehensive protection against money laundering within the art market.

The paper opted for an exploratory study using doctrinal and jurisdictional comparative analysis that focused on arguments for and against the inclusion of art dealers in respective DNFBPs definitions. Evaluation of these arguments concludes that art dealers should be included in Australia’s DNFBPs definition and subject to anti-money laundering (AML) regulation.

The current omission of art dealers from Australia’s DNFBPs definition perpetuates AML vulnerabilities within the Australian art market.

This paper fulfils an identified need to study high-value dealers not included in Australia’s DNFBPs definition and provide arguments for and against the inclusion of Australian art dealers in the listed DNFBP.