Search results

This study aims to examine the performance implications of an information governance (IG) framework for managing, controlling access to and securing information, focusing on (1) the performance benefits of an organization's IG orientation and (2) how the configuration of IG orientation and supply chain (SC) strategy type relate to performance outcomes.

This study leverages multiple secondary sources for US hospitals, serving as the context for the study. It also employs cluster analysis to develop an SC strategy taxonomy, namely sophisticated and delivery-focused SC strategies. The proposed research model is tested using a robust regression to mitigate the influence of outliers and produce more accurate estimates.

IG orientation is positively associated with financial performance and patient experience, and IG-oriented hospitals with a sophisticated SC strategy realize more financial benefits and achieve better patient care experiences compared to other configurations. Regardless of SC strategy type, IG-oriented hospitals offer better care experiences than non-IG-oriented hospitals.

This paper offers empirical evidence that a hospital's IG orientation and SC strategy jointly affect financial outcomes and patient experience. For hospitals, an organization-wide framework for governing information streamlines both intra- and inter-organizational information flows and improves care delivery throughout a patient's care experience.

This is one of a few studies that empirically examine the performance implications of governance of information in the domain of supply chain management (SCM). This study also develops an SC strategy taxonomy for the healthcare context and offers a springboard for research in service SC strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a scalable conceptual framework for governance of supply chain (SC) information flows by re-contextualizing the organizational concept of information governance as an SC concept.

This study leverages the strategy-structure-process-performance (SSPP) theory base to explain how effective SC information governance relates to improved internal SC performance. Via an in-depth literature review followed by conceptual theory building, the key features of organizational-level information governance are cast into a theoretical framework.

This study presents the theoretical framework that explains how SC information governance should contribute to improved internal SC performance. The proposed framework provides a theoretical basis for future research on SC information governance and would become a useful first step to extend the concept of SC information governance at the SC level.

SC managers should be aware that information governance mechanisms, rather than the management of basic, information flow-directed processes, to yield the best performance outcomes. Because of the numerous touch points information has in complex SCs, managing the quality of SC information through broader, higher-level governance standards is more important than maximizing connectivity and information flows, and information governance structures/policies across organizations should be designed accordingly.

This study theoretically links SC information governance and internal SC performance via information quality. It also advances the understanding of SC information flow by challenging the implicit but flawed assumption that uniformity of information quality within the supply chain to create the best outcomes.

In a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, a properly designed contract can lead to supply chain coordination. In this chapter, we model the selection of an appropriate coordinating contract from a menu of contracts including wholesale price, buyback, and markdown money, while allowing both the supplier and the retailer to assume the roles of Stackelberg leader and/or supply chain captain. This work extends previous literature that assumes that the supplier is both the Stackelberg leader and the supply chain captain. In our models, either agent can make stocking and pricing decisions. Our findings suggest that the feasibility of a coordinating contract depends on the addition of Pareto-improving, profit-sharing conditions that motivate agents to take part in the contract. Further, the selection of an optimal contract is based not only on which agent holds the overstock liquidation advantage, but also on the decision structure of the supply chain. For instance, when the supplier is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the supply chain captain, as well as holds the inventory liquidation advantage, and controls the stocking level, then a wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain under the proposed Pareto-improving profit sharing, termed Pareto-improving coordination. Additional results and managerial implications are presented in the chapter.